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EMPIRICAL CENTROID FICTITIOUS PLAY: AN APPROACH
FOR DISTRIBUTED LEARNING IN MULTI-AGENT GAMES
BRIAN SWENSON†∗, SOUMMYA KAR† AND JO ˜AO XAVIER⋆
Abstract
The paper is concerned with distributed learning in large-scale games. The well-known fictitious play (FP)
algorithm is addressed, which, despite theoretical convergence results, might be impractical to implement in large-
scale settings due to intense computation and communication requirements. An adaptation of the FP algorithm,
designated as the empirical centroid fictitious play (ECFP), is presented. In ECFP players respond to the centroid of
all players’ actions rather than track and respond to the individual actions of every player. Convergence of the ECFP
algorithm in terms of average empirical frequency (a notion made precise in the paper) to a subset of the Nash
equilibria is proven under the assumption that the game is a potential game with permutation invariant potential
function. A more general formulation of ECFP is then given (which subsumes FP as a special case) and convergence
results are given for the class of potential games. Furthermore, a distributed formulation of the ECFP algorithm is
presented, in which, players endowed with a (possibly sparse) preassigned communication graph, engage in local,
non-strategic information exchange to eventually agree on a common equilibrium. Convergence results are proven
for the distributed ECFP algorithm.
Index Terms
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I. INTRODUCTION
The theory of learning in games is concerned with the study of dynamical systems induced by repeated play of
a normal-form game. The general question of interest is, can player behavior rules be assigned that ensure players
eventually learn a Nash equilibrium (NE) strategy? In this paper, we address the more focused question: can player
behavior rules be assigned that ensure players learn a NE strategy and are practical in games with a large number
of players?
In particular, we focus on the well-known fictitious play (FP) algorithm. While FP does not converge1 in all
games [1]–[3], it has been proven that FP converges in games with an arbitrarily large number of players under
the assumption that the game is a potential game [4], [5]. This theoretically promising result suggests that FP
might be an ideal algorithm for some large-scale settings; however, the prohibitively demanding communication
and computational requirements of the algorithm make any large-scale implementation highly challenging, if not
impractical. In particular, it is to be observed that FP, in its classical form, may not be practical for implementation
in large-scale games because of the following problems:
1) demanding communication requirements,
2) demanding memory requirements,
3) high computational complexity.
We present an adaptation of FP which mitigates these problems, and by these criteria, is well suited to large-scale
games.
The traditional FP implementation and its variants assume that each player has instantaneous access to the time-
varying action histories of all other players. Moreover, such information access or gathering is assumed to be free,
which makes these implementations infeasible in practical large network scenarios. In fact, in such large networks,
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1In reference to FP or one of its variants, we use the term convergence to mean that the empirical frequency distribution of a FP process
asymptotically converges to the set of Nash equilibria, a notion to be made precise in Section II.
2each player may directly observe the actions of a few neighboring players only, whereas the actions of the others
need to be communicated efficiently through an underlying communication infrastructure. In order to explicitly
account for the communication costs that are to be incurred in the information gathering/dissemination process, and
thereby address problem (1) of demanding communication requirements of traditional FP, we assume a problem
framework where players are permitted to communicate via a preassigned (sparse but connected) communication
graph G = (V,E). In this framework, a node in the graph represents a player, and an edge in the graph signifies
the ability for players to exchange information. Furthermore, in our setup we assume that communication and the
repeated game play evolve according to the same discrete time clock and that players are permitted only one round
of communication per round of game play.
We refer to the classical setting, where players are assumed to have instantaneous access to the action histories
of other players, as a centralized-information setting. We refer to the novel setting presented in this paper, where
players have a limited ability to track the actions of others but may communicate with a local subset of neighboring
players via some underlying communication structure, as a distributed-information setting. We also note, in this
context, in the majority of game theory literature, a graph structure denotes the ability of a player to observe the
actions of a neighbor [6]–[9], not to exchange information, as in our approach.
In order to address problems (2) and (3), we propose a new variant of FP wherein players respond to the centroid
of the marginal empirical distributions (the centroid distribution) rather than track and respond to the entire tuple of
independent marginal distributions. We call this algorithm empirical centroid fictitious play (ECFP). The advantages
of this approach are a mitigation of the FP complexity problem (see Section VIII-B) enabled by a computationally
simplified best response rule (thereby mitigating (3)), and a mitigation of the FP memory problem by requiring
players to track only a single distribution (the centroid distribution) which is invariant to the number of players in
the game (thereby mitigating (2)). ECFP may be implemented in both the classical centralized-information setting
or the distributed-information setting that we introduce in this paper.
Our main contributions are twofold:
Main Contribution 1: We present empirical centroid fictitious play (ECFP)—an adaptation of FP that
mitigates the memory and computational demands of classical FP. ECFP addresses problems (2)–(3) associated
with FP in large-scale games. We show that ECFP converges in terms of average empirical distribution to a subset
of the mixed strategy Nash equilibria, which we call the consensus equilibria. Convergence results are proven for
games with identical permutation-invariant utility functions and can be extended to the larger class of games known
as potential games [5], with the restriction that the potential function be permutation invariant.
In section VII a generalized formulation of ECFP is given. In the generalized formulation the set of players is
partitioned into classes, and players track multiple centroids—one centroid for each class. The formulation allows
some of the initial assumptions regarding ECFP to be relaxed. Moreover, classical FP occurs as a special case of
ECFP in this formulation.
A significant issue with many learning algorithms in large-scale games is the rate of convergence in terms of the
number of players. While we do not present a formal analysis of the convergence rate of ECFP in this paper, we
note that experimental results and illustrative case studies (see Section VIII) suggest that the convergence rate of
ECFP (in its basic formulation) tends to be invariant to the number of players.
Main Contribution 2: We present distributed ECFP—an implementation of ECFP in which agent policy
update depends only on local neighborhood information exchange. The presented algorithm is an implementation
of ECFP within our distributed-information framework. It addresses all three problems (1)–(3) associated with FP in
large games. We prove convergence of the algorithm to the set of consensus equilibria. This convergence guarantees
that each agent obtains an accurate estimate of the limiting equilibrium strategy.
A. Related Work
An overview of the subject of learning in games is found in [10]. Many large-scale learning algorithms exist
that are not based on FP, including no-regret algorithms [11], [12], aspiration learning [13], and other model-free
approaches [14]–[16]. These learning algorithms tend to be fundamentally different than FP in that they do not
track past actions of other players.
Variants of FP have been proposed for two player games [10], [17]–[19] and are generally aimed at improving
various aspects of the two player algorithm (i.e., faster convergence, convergence in specific games, etc.).
3Sampled FP [20] addresses the problem of computational complexity of FP in large-scale games by using a
Monte Carlo method to estimate the best response. Although computationally simple in the initial steps of the
algorithm, the number of samples required to ensure convergence grows without bound.
Dynamic FP [8] applies principles of dynamic feedback from control theory to improve the convergence properties
of a continuous-time version of FP. The algorithm is shown to be stable around some Nash equilibria where
traditional FP is unstable. While the results generalize to multi-player games, there is no mitigation of the information
gathering problem. In [21], a similar algorithm utilizing only payoff-based dynamics is presented. Similar stability
results are shown when the class of games is restricted to games with a pairwise utility structure.
Joint strategy FP [22] is shown to converge for generalized ordinal potential games. Players track the utility
each of their actions would have generated in the previous round, and then use a simple recursion to update the
predicted utility for each action in the subsequent round. Actions are chosen by maximizing the predicted utility.
In joint strategy FP, the information tracking problem is mitigated by requiring agents to track only the information
germane to the computation of the predicted utility for actions of interest. No information gathering scheme is
explicitly defined; players are assumed to have full access to the necessary information at all times. In distributed
ECFP, proposed in this paper, the information gathering scheme is explicitly defined via a preassigned (but arbitrary)
communication graph, and convergence results are demonstrated when inter-agent communication is restricted to
local neighborhoods conformant to the graph.
Na and Marden [23] present a systematic methodology for designing local-agent utility functions such that the
NE of the designed game coincide with optimizers of a prespecified objective function; moreover, the agent utility
functions may be designed to achieve a desired degree of ‘locality’, in the sense that the designed utility functions
depend only on information from a set of local neighboring agents. The desired degree of locality is achieved by
augmenting agents’ action space with a set of state space variables consisting of a value and an estimate of the value
of each opponent. Although the context is quite different from distributed ECFP (designing the utility structure vs.
designing learning dynamics), both works seek to address the communication problem in large games by restricting
information exchange to a local neighborhood of each player. However, in [23] agents estimate the ‘value’ held by
each of the other n− 1 players, hence the memory size of the messages that must be passed grows linearly with
the size of the game, as opposed to distributed ECFP in which the memory size of messages is invariant to n.
In payoff based approaches (e.g., [24], [18]) it is assumed that players measure the instantaneous payoff informa-
tion and base future action choices off this information alone. Payoff based approaches apply when instantaneous
payoff information is available, and are generally very effective at mitigating communication, memory, and complex-
ity requirements. However, there are scenarios in which, even if the utility structure is available, the instantaneous
payoffs are not—in such cases ECFP type approaches are applicable.
The work [25], studies the problem of learning NE in a continuous kernel aggregative game by sharing information
through an overlaid communication graph. The notion of using a communication graph to estimate the aggregate
behavior is similar to distributed ECFP where players use the graph to estimate the empirical centroid. However, in
[25] the underlying game is fundamentally different (continuous kernel), and the communication scheme is based
on asynchronous gossip. In this context, see also [26], our preliminary work on ECFP, which introduces the concept
of graph-theoretic aggregation of information in repeated play settings of the type considered in this paper.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section II sets up notation to be used in the subsequent
development and introduces the notion of consensus equilibria. In Section III the classical FP algorithm is reviewed.
Section IV introduces ECFP as a low-information-overhead, repeated-play alternative to FP for learning consen-
sus equilibria in multi-agent games. Section V presents the distributed-information learning framework. A fully
distributed implementation of the proposed ECFP, the distributed ECFP, in multi-agent scenarios in which agent
information dynamics is restricted to communication over a preassigned sparse communication network is presented
and analyzed in section VI. In section VII we discuss the generalized formulation of ECFP, and present generalized
convergence results. In section VIII we demonstrate an application of distributed ECFP in a cognitive radio scenario
with a view to illustrating the analytical concepts developed in the paper. Finally, section IX concludes the paper.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Game Theoretic Setup
A normal form game is given by the triple Γ = (N, (Yi)i∈N , (ui(·))i∈N ), where N = {1, . . . , n} represents the
set of players, Yi—a finite set of cardinality mi—denotes the action space of player i and ui(·) :
∏n
i=1 Yi → R
4represents the utility function of player i.
In order to guarantee the existence of NE and work in an overall richer framework, we consider the mixed
extension of Γ in which players may use probabilistic strategies, and players’ payoffs are extended to account for
such strategies.
The set of mixed strategies for player i is given by ∆i = {p ∈ Rmi :
∑mi
k=1 p(k) = 1, p(k) ≥ 0 ∀k = 1, . . . ,mi},
the mi-simplex. A mixed strategy pi ∈ ∆i may be thought of as a probability distribution from which player i
samples to choose an action. The set of joint mixed strategies is given by ∆n = ∏ni=1∆i. A joint mixed strategy
is represented by the n-tuple (p1, p2, . . . , pn), where pi ∈ ∆i represents the marginal strategy of player i, and it is
implicity assumed that players’ strategies are independent.
A pure strategy is a degenerate mixed strategy which places probability 1 on a single action in Yi. We denote
the set of pure strategies by Ai = {e1, e2, . . . emi} where mi is the number of actions available to player i, and ej
is the jth canonical vector in Rmi . The set of joint pure strategies is given by An =∏ni=1Ai.
The mixed utility function for player i is given by the function Ui(·) : ∆n → R, such that,
Ui(p1, . . . , pn) :=
∑
y∈Y
ui(y)p1(y1) . . . pn(yn). (1)
Note that Ui(·) may be interpreted as the expected value of ui(y) given that the players’ mixed strategies are
statistically independent. For convenience the notation Ui(p) will often be written as Ui(pi, p−i), where pi ∈ ∆i is
the mixed strategy for player i, and p−i indicates the joint mixed strategy for all players other than i. This paper
will often deal with games with identical utility functions such that Ui(p) = Uj(p) ∀i, j; in such cases we drop the
subscript on the utility of player i and write U(p) = Ui(p) ∀i.
The set of Nash equilibria of Γ is given by NE := {p ∈ ∆n : Ui(p) ≥ Ui(gi, p−i) ∀gi ∈ ∆i, ∀i}, and the subset
of consensus equilibria2 as C := {p ∈ NE : p1 = p2 = · · · = pn}. The set of ε-Nash equilibria is given by
NEε := {p ∈ ∆n : Ui(p) ≥ Ui(gi, p−i)− ε, ∀gi ∈ ∆i, ∀i},
and the set of ε-consensus equilibria as
Cε := {p ∈ NEε : p1 = p2 = · · · = pn}.
The distance of a distribution p ∈ ∆n from a set S ⊂ ∆n is given by d(p, S) = inf{‖p − p′‖ : p′ ∈ S}.
Throughout the paper ‖·‖ denotes the standard L2 Euclidean norm unless otherwise specified. For δ > 0 we denote
the set Bδ(C) = {p ∈ ∆n : p1 = p2 = . . . = pn and d(p,C) < δ}.
In what follows (with the exception of Section VII where we pursue generalizations), we will restrict attention
to games with identical permutation-invariant utilities; formally, we assume:
A. 1. All players use the same strategy space.
A. 2. The players’ utility functions are identical3 and permutation invariant. That is, for any i, j ∈ N , ui(y) = uj(y),
and u([y′]i, [y′′]j , y−(i,j)) = u([y′′]i, [y′]j , y−(i,j)), where, for any player k ∈ N , the notation [y′]i indicates the
action y′ ∈ Yk being played by player k, and y−(i,j) denotes the set of actions being played by all players other
than i and j.
Note that because of assumption A.1, permutations of the form given in A.2 are necessarily well defined. Also
note that under these assumptions, the set of consensus equilibria is known to be nonempty [31].
2The concept of a consensus equilibrium is closely related to that of a symmetric equilibrium. The existence of symmetric equilibrium in
finite normal form games was first proven by Nash [27] in the same work where the concept of Nash equilibrium was originally presented.
In general, a symmetric equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium that is invariant under automorphisms of the game. A consensus equilibrium, on
the other hand, is a Nash equilibrium in which all players use an identical strategy. In the case of a symmetric game, the two concepts
coincide.
3Games where players have identical utility functions are referred to as ‘identical interests games’ [4]. They are closely related to potential
games [5] and have many useful applications in both engineering and economics [23], [28]–[30].
5Figure 1. Terms related to the empirical centroid.
B. Repeated Play
In a repeated-play learning algorithm, players repeatedly face off in a fixed game Γ. An algorithm designer’s
objective is to design the behavior rules of individual players in such a way as to ensure that the players eventually
learn a Nash equilibrium of Γ through the repeated interaction.
Let {ai(t)}∞t=1 be a sequence of actions for player i, where ai(t) ∈ Ai. Let {a(t)}∞t=1 be the associated sequence
of joint actions a(t) = (a1(t), . . . , an(t)) ∈ An. Note that ai(t) ∈ Rmi ; when necessary, we denote the kth element
of the vector a(t) by a(t, k).
Let qi(t) be the normalized histogram (empirical distribution) of the actions of player i up to time t, i.e.,
qi(t) =
1
t
∑t
s=1 ai(s). Similarly, let q(t) = 1t
∑t
s=1 a(s) be the joint empirical distribution corresponding to the
joint actions of the players up to time t.
Under assumption A.1 (i.e., when all players have identical action spaces), let q¯(t) = (q1(t)+q2(t)+· · ·+qn(t))/n.
Note that q¯(t) ∈ Rm, where m denotes the cardinality of the action spaces (assumed identical) of the individual
players. We refer to q¯(t) as the (eponymous) empirical centroid distribution, or the average empirical distribution.
Let q¯n(t) = (q¯(t), q¯(t), . . . , q¯(t)) ∈ ∆n denote the mixed strategy where all players use the empirical average as
their individual strategy.
In the exposition of ECFP and distributed ECFP, several terms will be introduced that are related to the empirical
centroid. Though we do not define all these terms now, the table below may be used for reference in determining
the relationship between these terms.
III. FICTITIOUS PLAY
A fictitious play process is a sequence of actions {a(t)}t≥1 such that, for all i and t,4
ai(t+ 1) ∈ arg max
αi∈Ai
U(αi, q−i(t)). (2)
Intuitively speaking, this describes a process where each player (naively) assumes that her opponents are playing
according to stationary independent strategies. Following this intuition, the player assumes that q−i(t) accurately
represents the mixed strategy of her opponents and chooses a next-stage action in order to myopically optimize her
next-stage utility.
In games where an FP process leads players to learn a NE, the equilibrium learning traditionally occurs in the
sense that the empirical frequency distribution converges to the set of Nash equilibria, i.e., d(q(t), NE) → 0 as
t → ∞. We refer to this form of learning as convergence in empirical distribution. In [4] it was shown that a
fictitious play process converges in this sense for games satisfying A.1 – A.2. While theoretically promising, the
result is of limited practical value due to the difficulties involved in a large-scale implementation of FP. In particular,
we propose that FP, in its classical form, may not be practical for implementation in large-scale games because of
the following 3 problems: (1) demanding communication requirements, (2) demanding memory requirements, and
(3) high computational complexity. We discuss each in detail below.
A. Demanding communication requirements
Implicit in (III) is the assumption that agent i has instantaneous access to the action history of each opponent.
We refer to this setting, where players have instantaneous access to information about the action histories of all
opponents, as a centralized-information setting. This might be impractical in a game with a large number of players.
4The initial action a(1) may be chosen arbitrarily.
6In this paper we consider a more practical and realistic setting in which players may be incapable of directly
observing the actions of opponents but are permitted to exchange information with a local subset of neighboring
players in order to estimate action histories they cannot directly observe. We refer to this setting as a distributed-
information setting; the topic is discussed in section V.
B. Demanding memory requirements
Inspection of (III) shows that each player must track the vector q(t) = (q1(t), . . . , qn(t)). The size of this vector
grows linearly in the number of players. In order to mitigate this problem, we consider ECFP, a variant of FP which
uses a modified best response function. In ECFP players track only the centroid distribution, q¯(t), the memory size
of which is invariant to the number of players.
C. High computational complexity
In order to choose a next-stage action, player i must solve the optimization problem (III). The computational
complexity of computing the mixed utility given an n-dimensional probability density function grows exponentially
with the number of players. In order to address this issue, we consider ECFP, a variant of FP that mitigates this
problem by means of a modified best response rule.
IV. EMPIRICAL CENTROID FICTITIOUS PLAY
The key idea of ECFP is a modification of the FP best response rule (III) which allows for mitigations in the
problems of memory, and computational complexity, associated with FP.
Consider a scenario in which a player does not have the ability to track the individual actions, ai(t), of any
single player. Rather, a player is only able to track the average action, a¯(t) := 1
n
∑n
i=1 ai(t), of the collective
and therefore has access only to the average empirical distribution, q¯(t) = 1
n
∑n
i=1 qi(t). An ECFP process is a
sequence of actions {a(t)}t≥1 such that for all i and t,5
ai(t+ 1) ∈ arg max
αi∈Ai
U(αi, q¯−i(t)), (3)
where q¯−i(t) = (q¯(t), . . . , q¯(t)) is the (n−1)-tuple containing (n−1) repeated (identical) copies of q¯(t). Intuitively
speaking, this describes a process where each player (naively) assumes opponents are playing mixed strategies which
are stationary, independent, and identical — the last assumption (identical opponent strategies) being the primary
difference between ECFP and FP. The player naively assumes q¯(t) accurately represents the (identical) mixed
strategy used by each opponent, and accordingly, chooses a best response to myopically optimize her next-stage
utility.
In an ECFP process (IV), the problem of demanding memory requirements is mitigated by requiring players to
track only the centroid distribution, q¯(t), a vector whose memory size is invariant to the number of players in the
game.
In ECFP, the mitigation in computational complexity is enabled by the introduction of the distribution q¯−i(t)
in the best response computation. In the joint distribution q¯−i(t), all players are assumed to use independent and
identical mixed strategies. Analogous to the manner in which independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) random
variables always make life simpler in statistics, the introduction of the “i.i.d.” joint distribution q¯−i(t) enables
simplifications in the ECFP best response computation. (See Section VIII for a detailed illustration.)
In contrast to FP, ECFP, in general, admits reduced complexity best response computation at the players, which
is enabled by the “i.i.d.” nature of the q¯−i(t) used in the ECFP best response computation (see (IV)). This same
factor may enable an explicit characterization of the distribution of certain essential statistics involved in the mixed
utility computation in terms of parametric statistical families. The FP best response (III), in contrast, is based on an
optimization involving the collection q−i(t) of individual empirical distributions; since the individual distributions
are generally different, the collection q−i(t) does not admit a similar simplification or reduced parameterization as
far as the best response computation is concerned. For more detailed illustrations of the relative complexities of
FP and ECFP best response computations, we refer the reader to Section VIII-B.
In a distributed-information setting (see Section III-A and Section V) players are unable to directly observe the
actions of others, and therefore may not have precise knowledge of q¯(t). However, they may form an estimate
5The initial action, a(1), may be chosen arbitrarily.
7of q¯(t) by exchanging information with a local subset of neighboring players. Similarly, in general, even in more
centralized information settings, due to other forms of uncertainty the q¯(t) may not be tracked exactly at each
player.
In general, we denote by qˆi(t) the estimate which player i maintains of q¯(t). Let εi(t) = ‖qˆi(t) − q¯(t)‖ be the
error in player i’s estimate of q¯(t) at time t. In practice, since q¯(t) is not available, the player i uses its estimate
qˆi(t) as a surrogate in the best response computation (IV). However, in order to ensure convergence of the ECFP
algorithm in such erroneous best response computation environments, we require that the following assumption be
satisfied.
A. 3. εi(t) = O( log ttr ), for some r > 0.
Under this assumption, players’ estimates, qˆi(t), are asymptotically ‘close enough’ to the true empirical centroid
q¯(t) to ensure the algorithm converges. We emphasize that the exact manner in which players form estimates qˆi(t)
of q¯(t) varies from one environment to another. For the specific distributed-information setting treated in Sections
V and VI, we will provide a distributed graph-based consensus-based estimation mechanism by which the players
can generate their estimates qˆi(t)’s and the latter will be shown to satisfy A.3.
By abusing notation, we will also refer to a sequence of actions {a(t)}∞t=1 as an ECFP process if
ai(t+ 1) ∈ arg max
αi∈Ai
U (αi, qˆ−i(t)) , (4)
where the initial action a(1) may be chosen arbitrarily.6 Note that, in the special case in which qˆi(t) = q¯(t), ∀i,
(IV) reduces to (IV) and this corresponds to a centralized information setting with perfect information. Finally, we
note that assumption A.3 (and its implication on erroneous best response computation) may be applicable in other
imperfect information settings beyond the specific distributed-information formulation that we develop in Section
V – VI.
In summary, in (IV) each player best responds using qˆi(t) (her personal estimate of q¯(t)) as the assumed mixed
strategy for the other (n − 1) players. In ECFP, players learn a strategy which is a consensus Nash equilibrium
strategy. The result is summarized in the following theorem.
Theorem 1. Let {a(t)}∞t=1 be an ECFP process as given in (IV), such that A.1 – A.3 hold. Then d(q¯n(t), C)→ 0
as t→∞.
Proof: Let a¯(t) = 1
n
∑n
i=1 ai(t), where ai(t) ∈ Ai. Let a¯n(t) ∈ ∆n be the n-tuple (a¯(t), . . . , a¯(t)).
Note that for t ≥ 1
q¯n(t+ 1) = q¯n(t) +
1
t+ 1
(a¯n(t+ 1)− q¯n(t)) . (5)
Using (IV) we write
U(q¯n(t+ 1)) = U
(
q¯n(t) +
1
t+ 1
(a¯n(t+ 1)− q¯n(t))
)
.
Applying the multilinearity of U(·), we obtain
U(q¯n(t+ 1)) = U(q¯n(t)) +
1
t+ 1
n∑
i=1
U (a¯i(t+ 1), q¯−i(t))
− 1
t+ 1
n∑
i=1
U(q¯i(t), q¯−i(t)) + ζ(t+ 1).
where we have explicitly written the first order terms of the expansion and collected the remaining terms in ζ(t+1).
Note that the number of second order terms in the above expansion is finite and the terms are uniformly bounded
6We note that the traditional definition of the mixed utility U(p), given in (II-A), is defined over the domain ∆n. The restriction of the
domain to ∆n is not necessitated by the definition; rather, it is a consequence of the traditional approach dealing only with mixed strategies
p ∈ ∆n. The approximated empirical distribution qˆi(t) ∈ Rm, however, is permitted to be outside the simplex, ∆i, and may even take
negative values. In this case we retain the definition of U(p), given by (II-A), but extend the domain to the set of all n-tuples of vectors in
R
m
. This adjustment of the traditional definition expands the domain to an unbounded set, but for practical purposes, we note that assumption
A.3 implies {qˆi(t)}t≥0 belongs to a compact set.
8since maxp∈∆n |U(p)| < ∞. Hence, there exists a positive constant M (independent of t) large enough such that
|ζ(t+ 1)| ≤M(t+ 1)−2 for all t. Thus,
U(q¯n(t+ 1)) ≥ U(q¯n(t)) + 1
t+ 1
n∑
i=1
U (a¯i(t+ 1), q¯−i(t))
− 1
t+ 1
n∑
i=1
U(q¯i(t), q¯−i(t))− M
(t+ 1)2
.
The permutation invariance and multilinearity of U(·) permits a rearranging of terms. The notation U([aj(t)]i, q¯−i(t))
indicates the expected utility player i would receive were she to use the strategy aj(t) and all other players use
the strategy q¯(t):
n∑
i=1
U (a¯i(t+ 1), q¯−i(t)) =
n∑
i=1
U



 1
n
n∑
j=1
aj(t+ 1)


i
, q¯−i(t)


=
n∑
i=1
1
n
n∑
j=1
U
(
[aj(t+ 1)]i , q¯−i(t)
)
=
n∑
i=1
1
n
n∑
j=1
U
(
[aj(t+ 1)]j , q¯−j(t)
)
=
n∑
j=1
U (aj(t+ 1), q¯−j(t)) .
Thus,
U (q¯n(t+ 1))− U (q¯n(t)) + M
(t+ 1)2
≥ 1
t+ 1
n∑
i=1
U (ai(t+ 1), q¯−i(t))− 1
t+ 1
n∑
i=1
U(q¯i(t), q¯−i(t)). (6)
Let vmi () : ∆i → R, vmi (f) := maxαi∈Ai U(αi, f−i) − U(fn), where f−i := (f, . . . , f) is the (n − 1)-tuple and
fn = (f, . . . , f) is an n-tuple. Let Li(t + 1) = vmi (qˆi(t)) − U (ai(t+ 1), q¯−i(t)). Substituting in Li(t + 1), (IV)
becomes
U (q¯n(t+ 1))− U (q¯n(t)) + M
(t+ 1)2
+
1
t+ 1
n∑
i=1
Li(t+ 1)
≥ 1
t+ 1
n∑
i=1
(vmi (qˆi(t))− U (q¯i(t), q¯−i(t))) =
αt+1
t+ 1
,
where αt+1 :=
∑n
i=1 (v
m
i (qˆi(t))− U (q¯i(t), q¯−i(t))) . Note that U(·) is multilinear and therefore locally Lipschitz
continuous. As noted earlier, assumption A.3 implies that {qˆi(t)}t≥1 is contained in a compact subset of Rm.
Therefore, there exists a positive constant K (independent of t), such that |U(ai(t + 1), qˆ−i(t)) − U(ai(t +
1), q¯−i(t))| ≤ K‖(ai(t+1), qˆ−i(t))−(ai(t+1), q¯−i(t))‖, for all t. By assumption A.3, ‖qˆ−i(t)− q¯−i(t)‖ = O( log ttr ),
and hence |U(ai(t + 1), qˆ−i(t)) − U(ai(t + 1), q¯−i(t))| = O( log ttr ), which, by (IV), implies Li(t) = O( log ttr ). In
particular,
∑T
t=2
Li(t)
t
< B is bounded above by some B ∈ R for all T ≥ 1. Summing over 1 ≤ t ≤ T in (IV),
U(q¯n(T + 1)) − U(q¯n(1)) +
T∑
t=1
M
(t+ 1)2
+
T∑
t=1
n∑
i=1
Li(t+ 1)
t+ 1
(7)
≥
T∑
t=1
αt+1
t+ 1
.
Note that
∑T
t=1
M
(t+1)2 is summable; therefore all terms on the left hand side are bounded above for all T ≥ 1, and
hence it follows that
T∑
t=2
αt
t
< B
9is bounded above by some B ∈ R, for all T ≥ 2. Let βt+1 =
∑n
i=1 [v
m
i (q¯(t)) − U (q¯n(t))], and note that, by
definition of vmi (·), βt ≥ 0 for all t. By Lemma 4 in the appendix, |vmi (qˆi(t))− vmi (q¯(t))| = O
(
log t
tr
)
. Thus,
|αt − βt| = O
(
log t
tr
)
and hence by Lemma 5,
∑T
t=2
βt
t
<∞ converges as T →∞. By Lemma 3 it then follows that
lim
T→∞
β2 + β3 + . . .+ βT
T
= 0.
Subsequently, by Lemma 6, we obtain for every ε > 0,
lim
T→∞
#{1 ≤ t ≤ T : q¯n(t) /∈ Cε}
T
= 0.
By Lemma 7, this is equivalent to
lim
T→∞
#{1 ≤ t ≤ T : q¯n(t) /∈ Bδ(C)}
T
= 0
for every δ > 0. Finally, by Lemma 8, we obtain d(q¯n(t), C)→ 0 as t→∞.
We emphasize that Theorem 1 shows that the n-tuple of the average empirical distribution converges to C , that
is, d(q¯n(t), C)→ 0. This is not the same as the more traditional definition of convergence in empirical frequency,
d(q(t), C)→ 0 as t→∞. (8)
In the former, the n-tuple containing repeated copies of the empirical centroid converges to equilibrium, in the
latter, the tuple of individual empirical distributions converges to equilibrium.
The practical meaning of Theorem 1 is that players do in fact learn a consensus equilibrium strategy. It
is true that each player i has access only to the distribution qˆi(t). However, the tuple of these distributions
(qˆ1(t), qˆ2(t), . . . , qˆn(t)) also converges asymptotically to the set of consensus equilibria (see A.3), i.e.,
d((qˆ1(t), qˆ2(t), . . . , qˆn(t)), C)→ 0 as t→∞,
by A.3. Therefore, player i has direct access to her portion of the convergent joint strategy. Thus each player i
learns a strategy which is a Nash (consensus) equilibrium with respect to the strategies learned by other players.
Note also the set of limit points of ECFP is restricted to C—a subset of the NE. Thus, if Pareto superior Nash
equilibria exist outside the set C , then ECFP will never reach these points, though an algorithm such as FP may.
This may be seen as a tradeoff for the improvements in memory and complexity achieved in ECFP.
V. DISTRIBUTED-INFORMATION SETTING
In a centralized-information setting (with perfect information), players are assumed to have instantaneous knowl-
edge of the action histories of all other players. Such an assumption is clearly impractical in a large-scale scenario.
We refer to a setting where players are unable to directly observe the actions of all opponents but are equipped with
an underlying communication infrastructure through which they can communicate with a local subset of neighboring
players, as a distributed-information setting. This is the framework used by the distributed algorithms considered
in this paper.
In order to explicitly account for the communication costs that are to be incurred in the information gather-
ing/dissemination process, we assume a problem framework wherein players are permitted to communicate via a
preassigned (sparse but connected) communication graph G = (V,E). Formally, we assume:
A. 4. Players are endowed with a preassigned communication graph G = (V,E), where the vertices V represent
the players and the edge set E consists of communication links (bidirectional) between pairs of players that can
communicate directly. The graph G is connected.
A. 5. Players directly observe only their own actions.
A. 6. A player may exchange information with immediate neighbors, as defined by G, at most once for each
iteration or round of the repeated play.
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Communication is treated as non-strategic — players do not manipulate the information they send for strategic
gain. Also, we emphasize that this is a 1-time step approach — game play and communication take place at the
same rate, i.e., evolve according to the same discrete time clock. Note that if players could communicate arbitrarily
often between game plays then, in a certain sense, we would be back to the centralized setting since infinite rounds
of consensus deliver q(t) at each player. By restricting ourselves to one round of consensus per game play, we face
a more realistic and challenging scenario.
In a distributed-information implementation of ECFP, subsequent to each round of the repeated play, players
exchange information once with immediate neighbors to form an updated estimate, qˆi(t). The next stage action
ai(t+ 1) is then chosen as a best response to this estimate according to (IV).
The exact manner in which players update their estimate qˆi(t) is a question of algorithmic design. The important
factor is that the estimates be formed in a way such that assumption A.3 is satisfied. In section VI we present a
distributed-information implementation of ECFP where players update qˆi(t) according to a consensus-type algorithm.
VI. DISTRIBUTED IMPLEMENTATION OF ECFP
A. Distributed Problem Formulation
We present an implementation of the ECFP algorithm which utilizes the underlying communication infrastructure
presented in section V; we refer to the algorithm as distributed ECFP.
Define the following two matrices:
Q(t) := (q1(t) q2(t) . . . qn(t))
T ∈ Rn×m,
Qˆ(t) := (qˆ1(t) qˆ2(t) . . . qˆn(t))
T ∈ Rn×m
where qˆi(t) ∈ Rm denotes player i’s estimate of q¯(t) ∈ Rm. Let qˆ(t) ∈ Rn be the n-tuple (qˆ1(t), . . . , qˆn(t)).
The tuple qˆ(t) will be important in distributed ECFP; in particular we will prove that qˆ(t) converges to the set of
consensus equilibria.
B. Distributed ECFP Algorithm
Initialize
(i) At time t = 1, each player i chooses an arbitrary initial action ai(1). The initial empirical distribution for player
i is given by qi(1) = ai(1). Player i initializes her local estimate of the empirical distribution as
qˆi(1) =
∑
j∈Ωi∪{i}
wijqj(1) (9)
where Ωi is the set of neighbors of player i and the wij’s are constant neighborhood weighting factors.
Iterate
(ii) At each time t > 1, player i computes the set of best responses using qˆi(t) as the assumed mixed strategy for
each of the n− 1 other players. The next action
ai(t+ 1) ∈ {arg max
αi∈Ai
U(αi, qˆ−i(t))} (10)
is played according to the best response calculation. In the event of multiple pure strategy best responses, any of
the maximizing actions in (VI-B) may be chosen arbitrarily. The local empirical distribution qi(t + 1) is updated
to reflect the action taken, i.e.,
qi(t+ 1) = qi(t) +
1
t+ 1
(ai(t+ 1)− qi(t)).
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(iii) Subsequently each player i computes a new estimate of the network-average empirical distribution using the
following update rule:7
qˆi(t+ 1) =
∑
j∈Ωi∪{i}
wi,j (qˆj(t) + qj(t+ 1)− qj(t)) , (11)
where Ωi is the set of neighbors of player i, and wi,j is a weighting constant.8
The update in (VI-B) is represented in more compact notation as
Qˆ(t+ 1) =W
(
Qˆ(t) +Q(t+ 1)−Q(t)
)
, (12)
where W ∈ Rn×n is the weighting matrix with entries wi,j . We assume W satisfies the following assumption:
A. 7. The weight matrix W is an n× n matrix that is doubly stochastic, aperiodic, and irreducible, with sparsity
conforming to the communication graph G.
Note that given assumption A.4 (G is a connected graph), it is always possible to find a matrix W satisfying
these conditions (see [36]–[38]).
C. Distributed ECFP: Main Result
It is important to note that the process generated by (VI-B) – (VI-B) constitutes a special case of the general
ECFP best response dynamics given in (IV), in which the estimates qˆi(t) follow the construction (VI-B). Thus,
the sequence of actions {a(t)}∞t=1 generated by (VI-B)-(VI-B) is an ECFP process (in the sense of (IV)), although
to emphasize the distributed setting and constructions, we will refer to it as a distributed ECFP process. In a
distributed ECFP process, players learn a consensus equilibrium strategy in a setting where information exchange
is restricted to a local neighborhood of each agent. The result is summarized in the following Theorem.
Theorem 2. Let {ai(t)}∞t=1 be a distributed ECFP process such that assumptions A.1–A.2, A.4–A.7 hold. Then
d(qˆ(t), C)→ 0 as t→∞. In particular, the agents’ estimates qˆi(t) reach asymptotic consensus, i.e. d (qˆi(t), qˆj(t))→
0 as t→∞ for each pair (i, j) of agents. Moreover, the agents achieve asymptotic strategy learning, in the sense
that d((qˆi(t))n, C)→ 0 as t→∞ for all i = 1, . . . , n.
This result implies that the n-tuple (qˆ1(t), . . . , qˆn(t)) converges to the set C; since qˆi(t) is available to player i,
player i learns the component of the consensus equilibrium strategy relevant to her.
Proof: We would like to apply the results of Theorem 1 to the distributed ECFP process. Clearly, by hypothesis,
assumptions A.1 and A.2 hold and, as noted above, the distributed ECFP process is in fact an ECFP process in the
sense of (IV). By Lemma 2, the error in a distributed ECFP process decays as
‖qˆi(t)− q¯(t)‖ = O
(
log t
t
)
, (13)
thus A.3 is satisfied (with r = 1), and hence, the distributed ECFP fits the template of Theorem 1. Applying
Theorem 1 yields, d(q¯n(t), C) → 0 as t → ∞. By Lemma 2 we obtain, ‖qˆi(t) − q¯(t)‖ → 0 as t → 0, and the
result d(qˆ(t), C)→ 0 as t→∞ follows.
Again, we emphasize that this mode of convergence is not the same as the more traditional convergence in
empirical frequency (cf. (IV), and proceeding discussion).
7Note that (VI-B) is equivalent to qˆi(t + 1) =
∑
j
wi,j(qˆj(t) + 1/(t + 1)(ai(t + 1) − qi(t))). This is closely related to minimizing an
aggregate cost function using a distributed stochastic gradient descent method [32]–[35]: Jglob(q) = ∑n
i=1
E‖ai(t)− q‖
2 whose minimizer
is the average of actions over time and over players, and where the expectation is over the empirical distribution of ai(t) over time. The key
thing to note is that the exact minimizer of this cost is time-varying and, given that we are operating in a distributed environment with only
one round of communication allowed per time slot, we can only track this dynamic minimizer using an iterative method as given in (VI-B).
8Note that the set Ωi ∪ {i} in the summation indicates that player i uses her own (local) information and that of her neighbors to update
her estimate. The update rule is clearly distributed as information exchange is restricted to neighboring players only.
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VII. GENERALIZATIONS
A. ECFP in Permutation Invariant Potential Games
The assumption A.2 of identical permutation invariant utility functions can be relaxed in lieu of the following
broader assumption:
A. 8. The game Γ is an exact potential game with a permutation invariant potential function.
A game Γ is an exact potential game if there exists some function Φ(y) : Y n → R, such that
ui(y
′
i, y−i)− ui(y′′i , y−i)
= Φ(y′i, y−i)−Φ(y′′i , y−i) ∀i ∈ N,∀y′i, y′′i ∈ Yi.
The function Φ(y) is called a potential function for Γ. The generalized form of Theorem 1 is as follows:
Theorem 3. Let {a(t)}∞t=1 be an ECFP process such that A.1 (identical action spaces), A.3 (εi(t) = O
(
log t
tr
)
∀i,
for some r > 0), and A.8 hold. Then d(q¯n(t), C)→ 0 as t→∞.
Proof: Let Γ1 = (N,Y, {Ui}i∈N ) be an exact potential game with potential function Φ. Let Γ2 =
(
N,Y, {U˜i}i∈N
)
be a game with the same set of players and actions as Γ1, but with all players using Φ as their utility function
(U˜i = Φ, ∀i). Let CΓ1 and CΓ2 be the set of consensus equilibria in Γ1 and Γ2 respectively. Let q¯Γ1(t), q¯Γ2(t)
be the average empirical distributions corresponding to ECFP processes in Γ1 and Γ2 respectively. Note that the
set of consensus equilibria in Γ1 and Γ2 coincide [5]. Also note that Γ1 and Γ2 are best response equivalent [28],
therefore a valid ECFP process for Γ1 is a valid ECFP process for Γ2, and vice versa. Γ2 is a game with identical
action spaces and identical permutation-invariant utility functions and therefore falls within the purview of Theorem
1. By Theorem 1, d(q¯nΓ2(t), CΓ2)→ 0. By best response equivalence, any valid ECFP process in Γ1 is a valid ECFP
process in Γ2, therefore d(q¯nΓ1(t), CΓ2)→ 0. Since CΓ1 and CΓ2 coincide, d(q¯nΓ1(t), C1)→ 0.
Potential games are studied in [5]. A game that admits an exact potential function is known as an exact potential
game. The class of exact potential games includes congestion games [29]. Congestion games have many useful
applications in economics and engineering. We present an example of a congestion game in a distributed cognitive
radio context in Section VIII.
B. ECFP in Potential Games with Permutation Invariant Classes
The ECFP algorithm may be generalized to a setup where players track multiple centroids, each centroid
corresponding to a different class of players. This generalization allows for ECFP to be considered in more general
classes of games and allows for FP to be considered as special case of ECFP. Formally, assume
A. 9. Γ is an exact potential game with potential function Φ.
Let the players be partitioned into classes as follows. For m ≤ n, let I = {1, . . . ,m}, and let P = {P1, . . . , Pm}
be a collection of subsets of N ; i.e. Pk ⊆ N, ∀k ∈ I . A collection P is said to be a permutation invariant partition
of N if,
(i) Pk ∩ Pℓ = ∅, for k, ℓ ∈ I , k 6= ℓ,
(ii)
⋃
k∈I
Pk = N ,
(iii) for k ∈ I , i, j ∈ Pk, Yi = Yj ,
(iv) for k ∈ I , i, j ∈ Pk, there holds for any strategy profile y′ ∈ Yi, y′′ ∈ Yj, y−(i,j) ∈ Y−(i,j),
Φ([y′]i, [y
′′]j, y−(i,j)) = Φ([y
′′]i, [y
′]j, y−(i,j)).
Remark. A partition which places a single player in each class is always a valid permutation invariant partition.
In this case, the resultant ECFP process will be equivalent to FP. Moreover, if Φ is permutation invariant, then all
players may be partitioned into a single class; in this case, the resultant ECFP process will be equivalent to that
presented in Section VII-A.
For a collection P, define ψ(i) : N → I to be the unique mapping such that ψ(i) = k if and only if i ∈ Pk.
13
Given a permutation invariant partition P, let the set of symmetric Nash equilibra (SNE) relative to P be given
by,9
SNE := {p ∈ NE : ∀ k ∈ I, pi = pj∀i, j ∈ Pk}.
For k ∈ I , define10
g¯k(t) := |Pk|−1
∑
i∈Pk
qi(t)
to be the kth empirical centroid distribution relative to P. Likewise, define g¯(t) = (g¯1(t), . . . , g¯n(t)) where g¯i(t) =
g¯ψ(i)(t), to be the composite empirical centroid distribution relative to P.
As before, we consider a scenario where players do not have precise knowledge of the centroid distribution. Let
gˆki (t) be the estimate which player i maintains of the k’th centroid g¯k(t). Formally, assume
A. 10. ‖gˆki (t)− g¯k(t)‖ = O
(
log(t)
t
)
, ∀i ∈ N, ∀k ∈ I .
In this context, we say a sequence of actions {a(t)}t≥1 is an ECFP process (with respect to P) if
Ui(ai(t), gˆ−i(t)) = max
αi∈Ai
Ui(αi, gˆ−i(t)),
where,
gˆ−i(t) = (gˆ
ψ(1)
i (t), . . . , gˆ
ψ(i−1)
i (t), g
ψ(i+1)
i (t), . . . gˆ
ψ(n)
i (t)).
The following theorem asserts that an ECFP process will converge, in this generalized setup, to the set of SNE.
Theorem 4. Let Γ be a potential game, let P be a permutation invariant partition of the player set N , let {a(t)}t≥1
be an ECFP process with respect to P, and assume A.9 – A.10 hold. Then d(g¯(t), SNE)→ 0 as t→∞.
The proof of this result follows the same reasoning as the proof of Theorem 1 and is omitted here for brevity.
A distributed-information implementation of ECFP in this generalized setup may be achieved in a manner
analogous to that of Section V, with the primary difference that, in this context, players exchange estimates for
each empirical centroid distribution g¯k(t), k ∈ I .
VIII. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section we illustrate the operation of distributed-ECFP by implementing it in a cognitive radio application.
A. Cognitive Radio Setup
Let Ch indicate a finite collection of permissible frequency channels. Assume there are two classes of users
sharing the allocated set of channels: primary users and secondary users. Assume each primary user has been
assigned to a fixed channel from which they may not deviate. Secondary users are free to use any channel they
wish. The objective in this setup is for the secondary users to cooperatively learn a channel allocation that is both
fair and in some sense optimal.
Cast this setup in the format of a normal form game Γ = (N, (Yi)i∈N, (ui(·))i∈N) with N being the set of
secondary users, and Yi = Ch for all i. Let σr(y) (respectively, σr(y−i)) denote the set of users on channel r ∈ Ch
for the joint strategy y ∈ Y n (y−i ∈ Y−i).
The cost associated with channel r when k users are on channel r is given by cr(k). The utility for player i is
given by ui(y) = −cyi(σyi(y)), and the mixed utility is given by the usual multilinear extension. The game Γ is an
instance of a congestion game—a known subset of potential games—and hence is amenable to ECFP by Theorem
3.
9A symmetric equilibrium is typically defined as a Nash equilibrium that is invariant under any automorphism of the game. Note that, in
contrast to this, the definition of SNE given here has the additional constraint that it is defined relative to the particular partition P . If P
is such that no player is permutation equivalent to a player in another class, then the two concepts coincide. Furthermore, if P is such that
there is one player in each class, then the set of SNE relative to P will coincide with the set of NE.
10The terms g¯(t), gˆi(t), etc. as defined in this section are analogous to the terms defined in Table 1. The notation is changed from q’s to
g’s in this section to emphasize the differences in definition for the generalized setup.
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1) Communication Graph Setup: We assume that some small portion of spectrum is allocated for the purpose
of transmitting data pertinent to the learning algorithm (i.e., disseminating information about the empirical centroid
q¯(t).) Such an assumption is reasonable when the communication overhead associated with the learning algorithm
is relatively small compared to the objective data being transmitted, e.g., users objective is to transmit large video
files.
We model user-to-user communication using a geometric random graph. In implementing the ECFP algorithm
of Section VI, we assign the weight constants wi,j of (VI-B) according to the Metropolis-Hastings rule [39].
B. Best Response Computation
On the surface, the ECFP best response calculation (IV) appears to have the same complexity as the FP
best response calculation (III). However, the symmetry inherent in the distribution q¯−i(t) used in the ECFP best
response calculation leads to mitigations in computational complexity. We contrast the FP and ECFP best response
computations for the case of the cognitive radio game.
1) ECFP Best Response Computation: In order to choose a best response in ECFP, a player must compute11
arg max
yi∈Yi
Eq¯−i(t)[u(yi, y−i)],
where y−i is a random variable with distribution q¯−i(t). The symmetry in the game allows for the following
simplification,
Eq¯−i(t)[u(yi, y−i)] =
n−1∑
k=0
cyi(k + 1)Pq¯−i(t)(σyi(y−i) = k). (14)
In the above, players only need to compute the probability associated with having k users on each channel rather
than computing the probability of every possible configuration of users.
From here, the symmetry in the i.i.d. distribution q¯−i(t) allows for further simplifications. Let yi = r ∈ Ch and
note that12
Pq¯−i(t)(σr(y−i) = 0) = (1− q¯(t, r))n−1
Pq¯−i(t)(σr(y−i) = 1) = (n− 1)q¯(t, r)(1 − q¯(t, r))n−2
Pq¯−i(t)(σr(y−i) = 2) =
(
n− 1
2
)
q¯(t, r)2(1− q¯(t, r))n−3.
As the above pattern suggests, the probability is binomial—for 0 ≤ k ≤ (n− 1),
Pq¯−i(t)(σyi(y−i) = k) =
(
n− 1
k
)
q¯(t, r)k(1− q¯(t, r))n−1−k .
Thus, the requisite probability is given by a computationally simple closed form expression, and the expected
utility can be easily computed using (VIII-B1). Furthermore, since players compute a best response each iteration,
they reap the computational benefits of using this simplified form for Pq−i(t)(σyi(y−i) = k) on each iteration of
ECFP.
2) FP Best Response Computation: In order to choose a best response in FP, a player must compute
arg max
yi∈Yi
Eq−i(t)[u(yi, y−i)],
where y−i is a random variable with distribution q−i(t). As before, the symmetry in the game allows for a
simplification to
Eq−i(t)[u(yi, y−i)] =
n−1∑
k=0
cyi(k + 1)Pq−i(t)(σyi(y−i) = k).
11In the ECFP best response (IV), a player must maximize the mixed utility maxαi∈Ai U(αi, q¯−i(t)). Recall that the mixed utility (II-A)
is the expected value of u(·) given that players are using probabilistic strategies q¯−i(t). Thus, maximizing the mixed utility of (IV) is
equivalent to maximizing the expected value below.
12Recall that the notation q¯(t, r) refers to the rth element of the vector q¯(t). In ECFP, players (incorrectly) assume that all opponents
are independently using the identical mixed strategy q¯(t). Under this assumption, the probability of any given opponent using channel r is
given by q¯(t, r).
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However, due to the lack of structure in q−i(t), no further simplifications are possible. To illustrate the complexity
of this, let yi = r ∈ Ch and note that
Pq−i(t)(σr(y−i) = 0) =
∏
j 6=i
(1− qj(t, r))n−1
Pq−i(t)(σr(y−i) = 1) =
∑
j1 6=i
qj1(t, r)
∏
j2 6=i,j1
(1− qj2(t, r))n−2
Pq−i(t)(σr(y−i) = 2) =∑
j1 6=i
∑
j2>j1
qj1(t, r)qj2(t, r)
∏
j3 6=i,j1,j2
(1− qj3(t, r))n−3.
In general, when the q(t) corresponds to a mixed strategy, the complexity of evaluating Pq−i(t)(σr(y−i) = k)
grows combinatorially with k—even in this game with symmetric payoffs.
C. Simulation Results
We simulated ECFP in two different cognitive radio scenarios. In the first, there are 10 channels and 400 users,
and the cost function for channel r ∈ Ch is given by a cubic polynomial of the form
cr(k) = a3k
3 + a2k
2 + a1k + a0,
where k is the number of users on channel r and aj , 0 ≤ j ≤ 3 are arbitrary coefficients. Figure 2(a) show a
plot of utilities U(q¯n(t)) and U((qˆ1(t))n) in the centralized and distributed cases respectively.13 The choice of
the distribution of player 1, qˆ1(t), to represent the distributed case was arbitrary—qˆi(t) for any i ∈ N produces
a similar results. In the distributed case, players communicated via a randomly generated geometric graph with
average node degree of 8.78.
Both the centralized and distributed algorithms were started with identical initial conditions. It is interesting to
note that, while multiple NE do exist, both algorithms tend to converge to the same equilibrium, regardless of the
communication graph topology. This trend suggests that the basin of attraction for any given NE is similar for
both centralized ECFP and distributed ECFP. Neither algorithm is noticeably superior in terms of the quality of
equilibria attained.
A useful feature of consensus NE (CNE) in this setup is their adaptability to players entering or exiting the game.
If a new player enters the game after an ECFP learning process has been running for some time, then incumbent
players can simply inform the new player of the current empirical distribution q¯(t), and the distribution q¯n+1(t)
(meaning the (n + 1) tuple which contains repeated copies of q¯(t)) will be an approximate CNE in the newly
formed (n+ 1) player game. Similarly, if a player exits the game, the distribution q¯n−1(t) will be an approximate
CNE in the newly formed (n− 1) player game.
In the second cognitive radio scenario simulated, there are 10 channels, each with a quadratic cost function. This
choice of cost functions guarantees the existence of a unique CNE. We simulated distributed-ECFP in this scenario
for the cases of 50, 200, and 500 users; each case had different randomly generated cost functions. In each case,
the communication graph was generated as a random geometric graph. The average node degree for the associated
communication graph in each case was 8.04, 8.72, and 8.98 respectively.
Figure 2(b) shows a plot of the normalized distance of (qˆ1(t))n to the unique NE in each case (the particular
choice of qˆ1(t) again being arbitrary). Distance was measured using the Euclidean norm, normalized by
√
n, where n
is the number of players. Simulation results suggest that the convergence rate of ECFP is independent of the number
of players. Indeed, the analytical properties of ECFP (in general, see Section VII) suggest that the convergence
is dependent only on the number of permutation invariant classes into which the player set is partitioned and not
the overall number of players. A rigorous characterization of the precise nature of this relationship may be an
interesting topic for future research.
13The notation (qˆi(t))n signifies the n-tuple containing n repeated copies of qˆi(t).
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Figure 2. (a) The average utility (taken over the set of players) of the joint empirical distribution, q¯n(t); and (b) The distance of the joint
empirical distribution to the set of NE.
IX. CONCLUSIONS
We have introduced a variant of the well-known FP algorithm that we call empirical centroid fictitious play
(ECFP). Rather than track and respond to the empirical distribution of each opposing player, as in FP, ECFP
requires that players track only the centroid of the marginal empirical distributions and compute a best response
with respect to this same quantity. The memory problem associated with FP in large-scale games is mitigated by
requiring players to track a distribution which is invariant to the number of players in the game. The problem of
computational complexity is mitigated by the introduction of symmetry into the best response calculation. ECFP
is shown to converge to the a subset of the Nash equilibria (the consensus equilibria), for potential games with
permutation invariant potential functions.
In addition, we have presented a general formulation of ECFP where the player set is partitioned into classes
and players track one centroid for each class.
We have introduced a distributed-information learning framework wherein it is assumed that players are unable
to directly observe the actions of others but may communicate with a local subset of neighboring players via
an underlying communication infrastructure. We presented an implementation of ECFP in this framework which
mitigates all three problems (communication, memory, and computational complexity) associated with FP in large-
scale games.
An interesting future research direction will be to investigate the convergence rate of ECFP in terms of both
the number of players and the number of classes into which the player set is partitioned. It would also be of
interest to investigate a distributed-information implementation of the ECFP algorithm within other communication
infrastructures (e.g., random link failures, asynchronous communications).
APPENDIX
A. Distributed averaging in dynamic networks
This appendix concerns topics in distributed consensus in networks where node values are dynamic quantities. The results
of this section are used to prove convergence of the distributed algorithms presented in section VI-B. Results in this section
are similar to results on distributed averaging in networks with additive changes in node values and information dynamics in
[32], [40], [41]. For a survey of traditional consensus and gossip algorithms, the reader may refer to [36], [37], [42].
Consider a network of n nodes connected through a communication graph G = (V,E). The graph is assumed to be
connected. Let xi(t) ∈ R be the value of node i at time t, and let x(t) ∈ Rn be the vector of values at all nodes. The goal is
for each node to track the instantaneous average x¯(t) = 1n
∑n
i=1 xi(t), x¯(t) ∈ R, given that the value at each node xi(t) is time
varying. Let δi(t) = xi(t+1)−xi(t) be the change in the value at node i, and δ(t) = x(t+1)−x(t) be the vector of changes
at all nodes, δ(t) ∈ Rn. Suppose the magnitude of the change at time t is bounded by |δi(t)| = |xi(t+ 1)− xi(t)| ≤ ǫ(t) ∀i.
We make the following assumption:
A. 11. The sequence {ε(t)}∞t=0 is monotone non-increasing.
Let xˆi(t) ∈ R be the estimate of x¯(t) at node i and let xˆ(t) ∈ Rn be the vector of estimates. We make the following
assumption pertaining to the initial error in players’ estimates.
A. 12. xˆi(0)− x¯(0) = 0 ∀i.
Let the average be estimated using the update rule
xˆ(t+ 1) =W (xˆ(t) + x(t+ 1)− x(t)) , (15)
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where the matrix W ∈ Rn×n is aperiodic, irreducible, and doubly stochastic with sparsity conforming to G. The following
Lemma gives a bound for the error in the estimates of x¯(t).
Lemma 1. Let the sequence {xˆ(t)}∞t=1 be computed according to (IX-A) such that assumptions A.4, A.7, and A.12 hold and
let the incremental change in x(t) be bounded according to assumption A.11. Then the error at any time t is bounded by,
‖xˆ(t)− x¯(t)1‖ ≤ 2
√
n
1− λǫavg(t),
where λ = sup
y∈Rn:
∑
i
yi=0
‖Wy‖
‖y‖ , and ǫavg(t) =
1
t
t−1∑
τ=0
ǫ(τ) is the time average of {ǫ(τ)}t−1τ=0.
Proof: Let e(t) = xˆ(t)− x¯(t)1 be the vector of errors in each players estimate of x¯(t), where 1 denotes the n× 1 vector
of all ones. Let δ¯(t) = 1n
∑
i δi(t), ∀t. Using the relation (IX-A) and the properties of doubly stochastic matrices, the vector
of errors may be written recursively as,
e(t+ 1) = W (e(t) + ξ(t)) (16)
where ξ(t) = δ(t)− δ¯(t)1. Note that
|ξi(t)| = |δi(t)− δ¯i(t)| ≤ |δi(t)|+ |δ¯i(t)| ≤ 2ǫ(t),
and,
‖ξ(t)‖2 =
n∑
i=1
(ξi(t))
2 ≤
n∑
i=1
4ǫ(t)2 = 4nǫ(t)2. (17)
Using (IX-A), the error e(t) can be rewritten as a function of ξ(t) and e(0), that is e(t+1) =
t∑
r=0
W r+1ξ(t−r)+W t+1e(0).
Using this relationship we establish an upper bound on the error,
‖e(t+ 1)‖ = ‖
t∑
r=0
W r+1ξ(t− r) +W t+1e(0)‖
≤
t∑
r=0
λr+1‖ξ(t− r)‖, (18)
where we have employed assumption A.12, e(0) = 0. Applying (IX-A) in (IX-A), we get ‖e(t+1)‖ ≤
t∑
r=0
λr+12
√
nǫ(t− r).
Recall that εavg(t) = 1t
t−1∑
τ=0
ǫ(τ) is the time average of the sequence {ε(t)} up to time t, and note that given our assumptions
on W , it holds that λ < 1 (see [36]). Note that, by Chebychev’s sum inequality [43] (p. 43-44),
t∑
r=0
λr+12
√
nǫ(t− r) ≤
t∑
r=0
λr+12
√
nεavg(t+ 1),
and hence,
‖e(t+ 1)‖ ≤
t∑
r=0
λr+12
√
nεavg(t+ 1)
=
(
λ
1 − λt+1
1− λ
)
2
√
nǫavg(t+ 1) ≤ 2
√
n
1− λǫavg(t+ 1),
giving the desired upper bound for the error.
Lemma 2. Let {a(t)}t≥1 be a distributed ECFP process as defined in section VI-B (see equations (VI-B)-(VI-B)). Then
‖qˆi(t)− q¯(t)‖ = O( log tt ), where q¯(t) is the average empirical distribution and qˆi(t) is player i’s estimate of q¯(t).
Proof: We use the second argument, k, to index the components of the vector qi(t) ∈ Rm. Noting that
qi(t+ 1) = qi(t) +
1
t+ 1
(ai(t+ 1)− qi(t)) ,
it follows that the maximum incremental change for any single value in the vector qi(t) is bounded by |qi(t+1, k)−qi(t, k)| ≤
1
t+1 = ε(t), where we let ǫ(t) :=
1
t+1 . Note that the distributed ECFP process (VI-B) is updated column-wise (each column
corresponds to an action k) using an update rule equivalent to (IX-A) of Lemma 1. Also note that, column-wise, all necessary
conditions of Lemma 1 are satisfied,14 and specifically, we have ǫ(t) = 1t+1 . Thus we apply Lemma 1 column-wise to Qˆ and
14The assumption of zero initial error (A.12) is satisfied since the initialization of qˆi(1) in (VI-B) is equivalent to letting q¯i(0) = 0,
qˆi(0) = 0 for all i in (VI-B).
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Q(t) of (VI-B), where x(t) of Lemma 1 corresponds to the k’th column of Q(t), and Xˆ(t) of Lemma 1 corresponds to the
k’th column of Qˆ(t), and obtain
‖qˆ(t, k)− q¯(t, k)1‖ ≤ 2
√
n
1− λǫavg(t) = O
(
log t
t
)
,
where qˆ(t, k) = (qˆ1(t, k) qˆ2(t, k) · · · qˆn(t, k))T and ǫavg(t) = 1t
∑t
s=1
1
t+1 = O
(
log t
t
)
. Thus, |qˆi(t, k)−q¯(t, k)| = O
(
log t
t
)
, k =
1, . . . ,m, ∀i, and hence, ‖qˆi(t)− q¯(t)‖ = O( log tt ), ∀i.
B. Intermediate Results
Lemma 3. Suppose the sum −∞ <
∞∑
t=1
at
t = S <∞ converges, then limT→∞
a1+a2+...+aT
T = 0.
Proof: By Kronecker’s Lemma [44],−∞ <
∞∑
k=1
ak
k = S <∞⇒ limT→∞
1
T
T∑
k=1
k akk = 0, which implies that limT→∞
a1+...+at
T =
0.
Lemma 4. For i ∈ N , let {q−i(t)}∞t=1 ∈ ∆−i and {r−i(t)}∞t=1 ∈ ∆−i be sequences such that ‖q−i(t) − r−i(t)‖ =
O
(
log t
tr
)
, r > 0. Let U(p) : ∆n → R be the (multilinear) mixed utility function defined in (II-A). Then
| max
pi∈∆i
U(pi, q−i(t))− max
pi∈∆i
U(pi, r−i(t))| = O
(
log t
tr
)
.
Proof: Let ζ′−i ∈ ∆−i and ζ′′−i ∈ ∆−i. Let p∗ = argmaxpi∈∆i U(pi, ζ′−i) and p∗∗ = argmaxpi∈∆i U(pi, ζ′′−i).15 U(·)
is multilinear and is therefore Lipschitz continuous over the domain ∆n. Let K be the Lipschitz constant for U(·) such that
|U(x)− U(y)| ≤ K‖x− y‖ for x, y ∈ ∆n. By Lipschitz continuity, it holds that
U(p∗, ζ′−i) ≤ U(p∗, ζ′′−i) +K‖ζ′−i − ζ′′−i‖
≤ U(p∗∗, ζ′′−i) +K‖ζ′−i − ζ′′−i‖, (19)
and thus U(p∗, ζ′−i) − U(p∗∗, ζ′′−i) ≤ K‖ζ′−i − ζ′′−i‖. By a symmetric argument to (IX-B), we also establish U(p∗∗, ζ′′−i) −
U(p∗, ζ′−i) ≤ K‖ζ′−i − ζ′′−i‖, thus |U(p∗, ζ′−i)− U(p∗∗, ζ′′−i)| ≤ K‖ζ′−i − ζ′′−i‖. It follows that,
| max
pi∈∆i
U(pi, q−i(t)) − max
pi∈∆i
U(pi, r−i(t))| ≤ K‖q−i(t)− r−i(t)‖,
implying the desired result.
Lemma 5. Suppose |at − bt| = O( log ttr ), r > 0, bt ≥ 0 and
∑T
t=1
at
t < B is bounded above by B ∈ R for all T > 0 . Then∑T
t=1
bt
t converges as T →∞.
Proof: Let
δt :=
{
bt − at if bt > at
0 otherwise.
It follows that δt ≥ 0 and bt ≤ at + δt. By hypothesis, |at − bt| = O( log ttr ), which implies that δt = O( log ttr ). It follows that,
T∑
t=1
bt
t
≤
T∑
t=1
at + δt
t
=
T∑
t=1
at
t
+
T∑
t=1
δt
t
.
Since
∞∑
t=1
at
t < B is bounded above,
∞∑
t=1
δt
t <∞ converges, and bt ≥ 0, it follows that
T∑
t=1
bt
t <∞ converges as T →∞.
Lemma 6. Let at =
n∑
i=1
[vmi (q¯(t))− U(q¯n(t))], then lim
T→∞
a1+...+aT
T = 0 implies that, for every ε > 0,
lim
T→∞
#{1 ≤ t ≤ T : q¯n(t) /∈ Cε}
T
= 0.
Proof: Let ε > 0 be given. By definition,
q¯n(t) ∈ Cε ⇔ vmi (q¯(t))− U(q¯n(t)) < ε ∀i. (20)
15Note that such p∗ and p∗∗ exist, as U(·) is continuous and the maximization set is compact.
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The utility function U(·) is assumed to be permutation invariant for all players, so an equivalent statement to (IX-B) is,
q¯n(t) ∈ Cε ⇔
n∑
i=1
[vmi (q¯(t)) − U(q¯n(t))] < nε.
Let
bt =
{
1, if at ≥ nε
0, otherwise.
Note that bt = 0⇔ q¯n(t) ∈ Cε and bt = 1⇔ q¯n(t) /∈ Cε, thus
#{1 ≤ t ≤ T : q¯n(t) /∈ Cε}
T
=
b1 + . . .+ bT
T
.
Note also that at ≥ 0. Clearly,
b1 + . . .+ bT
T
≤ 1
nε
a1 + . . .+ aT
T
,
implying lim
T→∞
b1+...+bT
T = 0, from which the desired result follows.
Lemma 7. lim
T→∞
#{1≤t≤T :q¯n(t)/∈Cε}
T = 0 for all ε > 0 implies that limT→∞
#{1≤t≤T :q¯n(t)/∈Bδ(C)}
T = 0 for all δ > 0.
Proof: Suppose lim
T→∞
#{1≤t≤T :q¯n(t)/∈Cε}
T = 0 for all ε > 0, but there exists some δ > 0 such that
lim sup
T→∞
#{1 ≤ t ≤ T : q¯n(t) /∈ Bδ(C)}
T
= α > 0.
Then there exists an ε′ > 0 such that
q¯n(t) /∈ Bδ(C)⇒ q¯n(t) /∈ Cε′ ,
which implies that
#{1 ≤ t ≤ T : q¯n(t) /∈ Cε′} ≥ #{1 ≤ t ≤ T : q¯n(t) /∈ Bδ(C)}.
This implies that
lim sup
T→∞
#{1 ≤ t ≤ T : q¯n(t) /∈ Cε′}
T
≥ α
for some ε′ > 0, a contradiction.
Lemma 8. lim
T→∞
#{1≤t≤T :q¯n(t)/∈Bδ(C)}
T = 0 for all δ > 0 implies limt→∞ d(q¯
n(t), C) = 0.
The proof of this result closely follows the proof of [4], Lemma 1, and is omitted here for brevity.
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